INTRODUCTION
What are the natural and probable consequences of breach of contract? Please illustrate/define/exemplify? 1 Juries may not award noneconomic damages for breach of contract. 2 The point is often expressed in the major contracts treatises, casebooks, and the Restatement (First) and Restatement (Second) of Contracts, with copious supporting documentation. 3 And yet, venerable authorities acknowledge that such losses may be real, 4 foreseeable, 5 or even likely 6 consequences of contract breach. Corbin takes it a step further, noting that contract breach "practically always causes mental vexation and feelings of disappointment by the plaintiff." 7 With a few exceptions, 8 this conventional wisdom thus concludes that frustrated promisees routinely are denied the opportunity to seek and recover noneconomic damages. This remedial gap is not an accident or a bug of contract adjudication-it is built into the very structure of the system.
The problem with this story is that it overgeneralizes and, consequently, misleads at two levels. First, "contract law" is legion: each state has its own peculiar contracting tradition, doctrine, and practice. Commentators de-emphasize regional variety in finding a broad exclusive doctrine against noneconomic losses. 9 This kind of monistic approach to contract law is common. Our understandings of purportedly uniform contract doctrineslike interpretation 10 and remedies 11 -are impoverished when we mistake the Restatement's certainty for the diversity that exists across the states.
But much more significantly, the conventional wisdom operates at the wrong level of analysis. It misses the actual mechanism by which contract damages are shaped in real cases-jury instructions. This Article remedies that failure by conducting the first comprehensive academic study of pattern contract jury instructions in all fifty states and the District of Columbia. Such pattern instructions form the preapproved baseline against which real jury instructions are drafted and exert significant influence at trial. 12 Analysis of these pattern instructions results in a more muddled picture than the treatises would have led us to believe. We find that there are four basic approaches to contract remedy instructions, which guide-or fail to guide-7. 11 CORBIN, supra note 2, § 59.1, at 539; see also MURRAY, supra note 2, § 124 (noting the foreseeability "that [an] aggrieved party will often be unhappy after a breach and [that] the breach may even cause some mental pain and suffering"). Interestingly, Corbin further opines that plaintiffs "seldom think[] of asking" to be compensated for emotional harm. 11 CORBIN, supra note 2, § 59.1, at 539. 9. This is related to the claim that general contract law, as such, does not and should not exist, as various more specified jurisprudential frames actually govern transactions. Law and Morality, 21 RATIO JURIS 194, 201-02 (2008) .
12. See infra Part II. [Vol. 81 juries through the process of awarding general damages in significantly different ways. We couple this research with a preliminary psychological experiment in which we test how lay people react to these different pattern jury instructions. In each category, we find jurors eager to "overcompensate" plaintiffs. Most interestingly-and perhaps surprisingly-we find some evidence that this overcompensation is closely linked to more general principles of jury control and may best be explained as an award for noneconomic losses. Therefore, in the majority of American jurisdictions, juries instructed with the pattern instructions may be likely to include noneconomic damages for breach as a matter of course. Indeed, in eight jurisdictions, 13 jurors hearing contract cases are instructed to award damages in a way that is very hard to distinguish from ordinary tort remedies.
Looking carefully at pattern instructions thus excavates the hidden diversity in contract doctrine, as well as jurisdictions' surprising flexibility regarding damages. Although it may be true that in many (but not all) states a judge would deny a claim for noneconomic losses if it were squarely presented in a motion, most juries will be instructed in a way that makes the award of noneconomic damages likely. Thus, noneconomic damages in contract cases are not the exception-they are probably the norm.
We proceed as follows. Part I details the conventional wisdom on contract remedies as collected in treatises, casebooks, and court opinions. Part II describes pattern jury instructions, a remarkably neglected source of information about contract law. Part III categorizes existing contract jury instructions on noneconomic losses. Finally, Part IV uses these categories to generate a survey experiment suggesting how lay people will respond to different instructions. Part IV also describes the significance of these results for conventional understandings of the law of contract remedies.
I. CONSTRUCTING THE CONVENTIONAL ACCOUNT
The conventional account of noneconomic contract losses rests on citations to appellate court opinions that dismiss plaintiffs' claims to have suffered a nonpecuniary loss. 14 Obviously, generalizing from such rare and exceptional opinions may mislead-we have no idea how many contract plaintiffs assert damages based on noneconomic losses, how many such cases are settled before trial for some nontrivial sum, how many cases are tried and not appealed, etc. Treatise writers, unburdened by such doubts, generally assert that cases awarding noneconomic damages are exceptional and rare. 15 They offer various justifications for this state of affairs. 16 13. See infra Part III.C. 14. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 15. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
By far the most commonly advanced reason why noneconomic losses are not awarded is that doing so would result in overcompensation. The possibility of economic gain motivates most litigated bargains; expectation damages protect that interest. Parties concerned about nonpecuniary gains and losses will price those items into the contract. By permitting noneconomic losses to be recoverable, the nonbreaching party in effect would be allowed a double recovery. 17 Others invoke arguments grounded in practical concerns about predictability and its effect on future contracting. Noneconomic losses may be unforeseeable 18 or uncertain. 19 Permitting such damages raises floodgate concerns, as they are purportedly more likely to be frivolous or fraudulent. 20 Thus, forbidding noneconomic damages might be linked to a larger pro-growth, anti-litigation movement. 21 If citizens dislike this policy choice, their representatives in the legislature can always intervene. 22 So deeply held is the prohibition against noneconomic damages that treatise writers rank it as the fourth general limitation of damages-alongside the trinity of foreseeability, avoidability, and certainty. 23 16. See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, Breach Is for Suckers, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1003 REV. , 1011 REV. (2010 (arguing that the noneconomic damage bar may relate to a fear of expressive contests in contract law).
17. 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 12.17, at 292 (" [T] he real basis of [limiting recovery for emotional harm] is that such recovery is likely to result in disproportionate compensation, and that the rule could therefore be subsumed under the more general [unforeseeability limitation]."); 2 MODERN LAW, supra note 2, § 18:6 (noting that one reason for limiting emotional harm damages is that they are not in the contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting). Corbin colorfully explains that "[p]ecuniary deprivation may reduce one to poverty and bankruptcy, resulting in humiliation and mental discomfort, but damages are rarely awarded for such humiliation and discomfort." 11 CORBIN, supra note 2, § 59.1, at 541; see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 341 cmt. a (1932) ("In some cases of sudden poverty or bankruptcy, the suffering may be more severe than in cases involving marriage or death; but for mental suffering so caused, no compensatory damages are given."); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 cmt. a (1981) (using similar language, but concluding that "if the contract is not one where [severe emotional disturbance] was a particularly likely risk, there is no recovery for [sudden impoverishment or bankruptcy]" (emphasis added)). Corbin claims that emotional harm is "disregarded" because plaintiffs will be entirely satisfied by "an equivalent pecuniary satisfaction for pecuniary injury." 11 CORBIN, supra note 2, § 59.1, at 539.
18. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 2, at xix (listing "mental distress and personal injury" damages as part of a section on foreseeability).
19. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 (1981) (explaining that "[e] ven if they are foreseeable, [damages for emotional disturbance] are often particularly difficult to establish and to measure"); CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 2, § 14.5(b) (too remote to be in parties' contemplation); 11 CORBIN, supra note 2, § 59.1, at 535 (same).
20. 2 MODERN LAW, supra note 2, § 18:6. 21. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 2, § 14.5(b); 11 CORBIN, supra note 2, § 59.1, at 535-36. Corbin claims that this approach has been adopted by "most courts." 11 CORBIN, supra note 2, § 59.1, at 535-36.
22. 24 WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 64:7, at 77 (noting that due to the "enormous public policy implications that flow from the allowance of recovery of emotional distress damages from breach of an employment contract," changes in the law are better left to the legislature).
23. MURRAY, supra note 2, § 124, at 787.
Just as there are exceptions to the traditional trinity of limitation, treatise writers admit that the prohibition of noneconomic damages is imperfectly enforced. The literature advances three typical excepting scenarios: (1) when the contract is unusually personal, 24 (2) when the breaching party is unusually evil, 25 or (3) when the breach creates unusually severe harm. 26 We will briefly discuss these three exceptional categories.
A. Unusually Personal Contracts
Many modern commentators focus their discussion of noneconomic damages on developing ever more finely parsed case typologies. 27 Typical categories include contracts touching on marriage, common carriers, and contracts for funeral arrangements or other end-of-life matters. That is, contracts of an unusually personal nature. 28 Marriage contracts for which courts have allowed recovery of emotional harm include breach of contract to marry, 29 or a breach of contract to deliver a bride's trousseau prior to a wedding. 30 Corbin argues that breach of contract to marry "must be regarded as sui generis." 31 Courts have awarded noneconomic damages for breach of a variety of other contracts. For example, courts permit emotional harm damages against hotels and inns for mistreating or expelling guests, 32 wrongfully 24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 (excepting situations in which "the contract or the breach is of such a kind that serious emotional disturbance [is] a particularly likely result" (emphasis added)); 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 12.17; MURRAY, supra note 2, § 124; 24 WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 64:7, at 68 (noting that this principle is propounded in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts); see also CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 2, § 14.5(b) (contracts involving "'interests of personality'" (quoting CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON DAMAGES § 145, at 593 (1935) )); 11 CORBIN, supra note 2, § 59.1, at 536 (contracts involving "'interests of personality'" (quoting CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON DAMAGES § 145, at 593 (1935)) removing passengers from common carriers 33 or cars, 34 or ticket holders from entertainment venues. 35 Finally, courts permit emotional harm recovery for breach of contracts with sensitive subject matters like burial contracts of spouses or other relatives, 36 failure to properly transport or prepare a corpse, 37 and breach of contract to deliver communications of death or illness. 38 Other types of breaches that warrant recovery for emotional harm include harassing methods of debt collection and breach of contracts for medical services. 39 Courts have placed breach of confidentiality agreements in this category, including a psychiatrist improperly disclosing confidential information 40 and the failure to hide, as agreed, the faces of participants in a television broadcast. 41 
B. Unusually Evil Breaching Parties
Whether it is called willful, 42 The difference between the First Restatement's and Second Restatement's positions on recovery for emotional harm is significant, 49 though some treatises attempt to downplay the difference. 50 Section 341 of the First Restatement makes "wanton or reckless" breach a centerpiece of its exception for emotional harm 51 and devotes almost the entirety of the comment accompanying that section to expanding upon the claim that "the rule stated in this [s]ection denies recovery of damages for mental suffering, unless the breach was wanton or reckless." 52 The Second Restatement, by contrast, makes no explicit mention of the defendant's behavior in either the rule 53 or comment. 54 Instead, it allows recovery for emotional harm based on whether it is a particularly likely result of "the contract or the breach." 55 The disjunctive may imply that certain kinds of breach (e.g., intentional, willful, or reprehensible breaches) warrant recovery for emotional harm. This reading is not obvious, however.
Other variations exist. A "strong minority" of jurisdictions requires a contract that is particularly likely to cause emotional harm but expands recovery to cases of mere negligence. 56 Also, where "willful or wanton infliction of mental distress" is recognized as a tort independent of bodily injury, "the fact that the infliction of such suffering is also a breach of 49 . Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 ("Recovery for emotional disturbance will be excluded unless the breach also caused bodily harm or the contract or the breach is of such a kind that serious emotional disturbance was a particularly likely result."), with RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 341 ("In actions for breach of contract, damages will not be given as compensation for mental suffering, except where the breach was wanton or reckless and caused bodily harm and where it was the wanton or reckless breach of a contract to render a performance of such a character that the defendant had reason to know when the contract was made that the breach would cause mental suffering for reasons other than mere pecuniary loss.").
50. Farnsworth contrasts courts that look to the "nature of the contract" (thus following the Second Restatement) with courts that consider the "nature of the breach." 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 12.17, at 292-93. In doing so, Farnsworth appears to read the Second Restatement as not allowing recovery for emotional harm based on the manner of the breach. Williston, by contrast, characterizes the Second Restatement as "an essentially similar, though perhaps slightly more liberal" recodification of the original rule. 
C. Unusually Harmful Breach
Another common exception to the general prohibition on noneconomic damages is when a breach of contract results in physical injury or extreme hardship. 62 Treatises frequently note the difficulty in distinguishing whether such actions are recoverable under a tort or contract theory. 63 Bodily injury due to either intentional or negligent wrongful conduct "is nearly always tortious." 64 The difficulty is compounded by the fact that, due to procedural reforms, it is often impossible to determine whether a case sounds in contract, tort, or both. 65 The First Restatement further notes that "it is common for a decision to be given without classifying the wrong for which damages are awarded." 66 In allowing recovery for noneconomic harm when physical injury attends a contract breach, courts may impose a variety of caveats. Some only permit such recovery when the injury was within the contemplation of the parties when forming the contract, 67 while others require that the injury rises to the level of a tort. 68 still require that the breach be willful, wanton, or insulting. 69 Corbin argues that a valid contract may include provisions for emotional harm damages due to physical injury, even though the conduct is not tortious. 70 Examples of cases include the breach of a promise to avoid a stillbirth by performing a Caesarean operation, or breach of a contract to perform cosmetic surgery. 71 The conventional wisdom thus concludes that emotional damages are for highly unusual contracts, which do not fit into the core of contract law. Although this may be the case in terms of official doctrine, we have reason to suspect that juries will take emotional damages into account even in regular core contracts cases.
II. PATTERN CONTRACT JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Jury instructions are the channel through which trial court judges communicate our highly specialized law to citizens. 72 Pattern jury instructions are generalized instructions that are published (and sometimes modified) for application to a specific case. 73 A state bar association typically approves such instructions 74 and courts usually accept them as authoritative. 75 Each instruction contains a single legal proposition, which, when combined, "form[s] a skeleton for the judge's charge to the jury." 76 A set of jury instructions commonly includes "1) [i]ntroductory instructions to also breaches an express contract, "there seems to be no good reason for applying a different rule as to the damages to be awarded." 11 CORBIN, supra note 2, § 59. CONTRACT CASES 1305 (1995 (noting that for the purposes of flexible application, pattern instructions are "necessarily abstract"). Pattern instructions are also called "standard, model, uniform, approved, and recommended jury instructions." Robert G. Nieland, Assessing the Impact of Pattern Jury Instructions, 62 JUDICATURE 185, 185 (1978) . But see 2 KEHOE, supra, at 1215 (pattern instructions are often no more than an illustrative template, while standardized instructions are intended for use "with virtually no modifications").
74. 92. See, e.g., HANNAFORD-AGOR & LASSITER, supra note 74, at 2 (pattern instruction committees have been especially successful in reducing the "number of appeals and reversals based on inaccurate instructions"); Marder, supra note 75, at 459 (explaining that drafters follow language from statutes or case law to avoid "problems for a trial judge when the case goes up on appeal"); Nieland, supra note 73, at 187-88 (citing a survey conducted by the Illinois Judicial Conference (IJC) which found that 700 Illinois appellate decisions between 1930 and 1955 passed on questions of instructions and that 38% resulted in reversals). Based on this study, the IJC recommended that the Illinois Supreme Court establish a committee to write pattern jury instructions. Id. (observing that pattern instructions may save time by (1) reducing research necessary in preparing instructions; (2) reducing judicial conference time necessary to settle conflicts over instructions; and (3) eliminating the need to draft instructions entirely).
93. E.g., Musser, supra note 73, § 5, at 931; see also Marder, supra note 75, at 460 (drafters "strive to use 'neutral' language that does not favor plaintiffs or defendants"). But see William W. Schwarzer, Communicating with Juries: Problems and Remedies, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 731, 737-38 (1981) (arguing that pattern instructions do not completely dampen argumentative jury instructions). Prior to the adoption of pattern instructions, attorneys penned argumentative instructions designed to persuade jurors to render favorable verdicts. See HANNAFORD-AGOR & LASSITER, supra note 74, at 1 (these argumentative instructions Pattern instructions for contract cases developed relatively late. 94 Originally, contract instructions were included in collections of sample instructions that had survived appellate scrutiny. 95 The "first wave" of standardized instructions, influenced by the California and Illinois models, however, almost completely omitted contract instructions. 96 Instead, these efforts focused heavily on torts. Indeed, drafting committees were openly skeptical of the feasibility of encapsulating the wide range of issues in contract cases into standardized pattern instructions. 97 were often "confusing, or did not accurately state the law"). These instructions were submitted to the court to be accepted or rejected.
93 ("[O] bviously there is another reason why emphasis should be placed on negligence law. In contracts . . . it is almost impossible to frame suitable generalized instructions."). Additionally, drafters focused on torts because courts were overwhelmed with negligence claims beginning during industrialization and continuing unabated into the mid-twentieth century. 2 KEHOE, supra note 73, at 1146-47, 1205-06, 1295 (the need for reform of tort cases dominating dockets caused drafting committees to skip "commercial topics"); see also Page, supra, at 151 (noting that Utah's new instructions focus on torts because "negligence trials preponderate in our courtrooms"). Pattern instructions were intended to save drafting time and minimize appeals for erroneous instructions. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
As pattern instructions for torts and other legal fields were successfully introduced, drafters grew more confident. 98 In 1966, North Dakota published the first set of contracts instructions. 99 A few nearby states soon followed its lead, 100 though by the end of the 1970s only twelve other states had drafted contracts instructions. 101 After a rush in the 1980s, 102 contract pattern instructions, approved or otherwise, are currently available in every state. 103 Despite the relative uniformity of substantive contract principles, contract pattern instructions are highly diverse from state to state. 104 At least one commentator credits this diversity to the elusiveness of the "right" approach to contract instructions and the "stubborn[] idiosyncra[cy]" of those already in existence. 105 As Kehoe explains:
Although the rules for determining liability for breach of contract usually coincide with social morality, the conventional legal measures of contract damages are often at odds with what the jury thinks is an appropriate award. Contract law is generally less compensatory than tort law, and yet the court's instructions on damages typically provide little effective guidance for determining the amount to be awarded. They usually tell the jury nothing more than to place the plaintiff in the position it would have occupied if the breach had not occurred. What that means in operation is left to the jury. REV. 1225 REV. , 1228 REV. -29 (1994 (discussing the undercompensatory nature of expectation damages); Wilkinson-Ryan & Hoffman, supra note 16, at 1006-07 (noting that expectation damages are undercompensatory both due to the doctrines of limitation and because they do not account for subjective harms).
Thus, even though modern juries are instructed on contract damages, it is not clear that they receive enough information-or the right informationnecessary to restrain them from awarding noneconomic damages. 107 In fact, abstract instructions are more likely to pass trial and appellate scrutiny than specific instructions. 108 The practice of using instructions that permit the jury to rely on its "innate sense of what would be right or wrong in carrying out promises" has garnered wide acceptance. 109 
III. A TYPOLOGY OF CONTRACT JURY INSTRUCTIONS
The extent to which pattern instructions guide juries through the process of awarding damages may significantly influence whether juries will award noneconomic losses. Taking the conventional account at face value, pattern instructions should routinely and explicitly bar juries from awarding noneconomic damages, save perhaps for traditional exceptions. They do not.
We identified pattern instructions for general contract damages in fortyeight states and the District of Columbia. 110 Instructions in only one 107. 2 KEHOE, supra note 73, at 1023; cf. Perlman, supra note 72, at 533 ("Jury instructions often employ legal terms in order to structure but not to eliminate the discretion of the jury. These terms are left without bright parameters in order to facilitate the jury's obligation to impose some form of community standard."). 108. 2 KEHOE, supra note 73, at 1318 (noting, however, a growing dissatisfaction with abstract damage instructions and the possibility of warm reception for closer jury regulation).
109. Id. at 1022-23, 1025 (positing that there is a value to "flexible application of social norms" by jurors in contract law and that "modern contract law continues to embrace more jury-oriented principles of fairness and reasonableness in lieu of the seemingly mechanical rules of classical contract"); see also Perlman, supra note 72, at 528 (noting that juries historically have been thought to contribute a measure of "community consensus," allowing them "discretion to depart from the judge's view of the case").
110 Alabama and North Carolina considered the nature of the contract. See 1 ALABAMA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL § 10.28 ("Where the contractual duty or obligation is so related with matters of mental concern or apprehensiveness or with the feelings of the party to whom the duty is owed, that a breach of that duty will necessitate or reasonably result in mental anguish or suffering . . . then in such event, if the Plaintiff is entitled to recover, he would be entitled to recover such sum as would reasonably compensate him for such mental anguish . . . ."); NORTH CAROLINA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR CIVIL CASES § 517.30 ("Before you may award such damages, (identify party claiming damages) must prove . . . . that the contract was so personal and so coupled with matters of mental concern or solitude, or with the sensibilities of (identify party claiming damages), that it was reasonably foreseeable at the time the contract was made, that a breach of contract could result in mental anguish to (identify party claiming damages).").
Both Colorado and North Carolina focused on the defendant's behavior (i.e., whether there was a willful breach or wanton conduct). See COLORADO JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR CIVIL TRIALS § 30:38 ("If you find that the defendant's breach of contract was willful and wanton, then you may also award plaintiff an amount that will reasonably compensate the plaintiff for any mental suffering that was the natural and probable consequence of the breach."); NORTH CAROLINA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR CIVIL CASES § 517.30 ("Mental anguish is that distress which may arise when a party's breach is wanton or reckless or when such party's conduct exceeds all bounds usually tolerated by a decent society and the conduct or breach causes mental distress of a very serious nature.").
Colorado law now prohibits the use of this noneconomic damages instruction for cases filed on or after Washington's instruction is unique. It appears to permit noneconomic damages, though it is far from explicit. 6A WASHINGTON PRACTICE: WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL § 303.01. Washington's instruction reads in pertinent part: "In order to recover actual damages, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant breached a contract . . . and that plaintiff incurred actual [economic] damages as a result of the The extent to which instructions guide jurors through measuring expectation damages varies greatly. While some take a step-by-step approach, others merely state abstract principles. The differences among them may influence how jurors perceive the availability of recovery for emotional harm. This Article uses this variation in jury instructions to categorize general damage instructions by their likelihood to constrain juries' discretion to award noneconomic losses. Four general models for contract damage instructions emerge: one catchall category and three specific approaches.
In fourteen states, instructions are determined largely on a case-by-case basis. 113 A typical example is Colorado, which merely instructs the user to "[i]nsert the proper measure of general damages." 114 We imagine that in most cases, the parties will confer and create a list of claimed damages. But defendant's breach, and the amount of those damages." Id. (emphasis added). Washington uses brackets to indicate alternatives; the adjective "economic" may be inserted or omitted. The notes on use contemplate that this feature will influence whether noneconomic damages are awarded. This section instructs the proponent to " [u] se the limiting adjective 'economic' before 'damages' in the second paragraph, unless the case falls within the exceptions noted in the Comment under the heading 'Mental Distress.'" Id. note on use. The comment embraces the conventional exception for noneconomic damages based on contract type. " [D] amages for mental suffering are not recoverable in a contract action except for certain categories of contracts for which a breach is particularly likely to lead to emotional distress." Id. cmt.; see also supra Part I.A. The comments often include instructions on what needs to be inserted in the bracketed text. Frequently, there is a "menu" of other damage instructions that can be chosen for insertion. For example, in Nebraska " [t] he measure of damages to be inserted in place of the first set of parentheses in the above instruction must be the measure that is appropriate for the kind of breach involved, the pleadings, and the evidence in the case. NJI2d Civ. 4.41 through 4.59 set out the appropriate measures of damages, under Nebraska law, for a number of different, specific kinds of breaches of contract." NEB. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 1 NEBRASKA JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL § 4.40 cmt. (2011) (2012) .
In other cases, the to-be-inserted text is left up to the judge and counsel. For example, Alaska's notes on use state that "[i]n most cases, it will be appropriate to give additional instructions telling the jury how to calculate the specific items of the loss of expectation interest. it is difficult to generalize from these placeholder or catchall pattern instructions, which we call "Non-Guiding" instructions. We discard them and focus on those pattern instructions that make a more complete attempt to guide the jury in awarding damages. Three approaches remain 115 :
(1) instructions that explicitly instruct juries using a formulaic, traditional expectation damages approach (which we call "Expectation Formula"); (2) instructions that require the jury to put the nonbreaching party in the same position as if the contract had been performed but omit the traditional expectation formula (which we call "Same Position"); and (3) instructions that merely ask the jury to award damages for harms that directly or naturally flow from, or are otherwise caused by, the breach (which we call "Natural Result"). 116 Figure 1 , below, summarizes our categorization. As it illustrates, the instruction categories have geographic correlates-almost all of the plains states, for instance, use Non-Guiding instructions, while the upper Midwest uses the Same Position instruction. These similarities probably indicate the influence of regional legal culture.
Figure 1: Instruction Categories
115. There is, of course, overlap. The purpose of the categories is not to suggest that their language is entirely dissimilar from each other. Rather, it is to show three distinct levels in the depth of guidance juries receive from pattern contract damage instructions.
116. See Appendix for details.
A. Expectation Formula
Expectation Formula instructions are those that both state the intention to place the innocent party in the same position as if the contract had been performed and guide the jury through the process of calculating that award. In other words, these instructions state the destination (same position) and provide a roadmap (loss + consequential and incidental damages -costs saved). Of the three categories, Expectation Formula instructions offer the most guidance in determining damages and may be most likely to constrain the jury's discretion. 117 Ten jurisdictions take this approach. 118 The District of Columbia's instruction exemplifies a "pure" expectation calculation:
The measure of damages for a breach of contract is that amount of money necessary to place the injured party in the same economic position Other jurisdictions allow juries more discretion. Mississippi jurors, for example, "can consider the losses incurred and the gains not realized" due to the breach. 122 Expenses saved by the nonbreaching party, however, "should be deducted from the amount awarded." 123 Still, opinions from Expectation Formula jurisdictions demonstrate that juries may be only imperfectly constrained by step-by-step instructions. Thus, in Mattuck v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 124 the plaintiff sued an auto manufacturer for breach of warranty when his leased vehicle experienced braking problems after several repairs. 125 The jury awarded the plaintiff $6,000 for breach of warranty and $2,500 for aggravation and inconvenience. 126 The defendant appealed, arguing that the plaintiff presented no evidence of damages. 127 The court's charge to the jury, similar to Illinois' pattern instruction, read in pertinent part:
In calculating Plaintiff's damages, you should determine that sum of money that will put the Plaintiff in as good a position as he would have been in if both Plaintiff and Defendant had performed all their promises under Defendant's written limited warranty and as required by law under the implied warranty of merchantability. The elements of damage claimed Maryland or New York's that define losses in monetary terms, juries may consider noneconomic damages to be a "loss incurred" or a "condition" to be rectified.
Further, three jurisdictions in the Expectation Formula category, Arizona, Illinois, and New York, engage subjective moral norms, instructing juries to award damages that will "fairly" compensate the plaintiff. CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM. OF The defendant argued that the plaintiff failed to prove the applicable standard of "measureable damages resulting from the breach." 129 The jury's $6,000 award for breach of warranty matched the calculation of the plaintiff's expert witness estimating the vehicle's diminution in value. 130 The appellate court thus concluded that the jury was "properly instructed on how to weigh plaintiff's damages" and declined to alter the award. 131 But the court failed to comment on the $2,500 of damages for aggravation and inconvenience.
B. Same Position
Rhode Island's pattern instruction neatly sums up the traditional purpose of expectation damages: "The underlying rationale on a breach of contract action is to place the innocent party in the position he/she would have been in if the contract had been fully performed. ("[T] he plaintiff is entitled to damages in the amount sufficient to place him/her in the same position in which he/she would have been if the contract had been fully performed by the defendant to the extent that the damages are reasonably certain and reasonably foreseeable." (emphasis added)). Although these factors may temper jurors' discretion to some extent, they stop short of a road map calculation of damages. The wording of such instructions varies. 136 Jurors are asked to put the nonbreaching party in the "same position" 137 or "as good a position" 138 as if the breach had not occurred. Other versions admonish the jury not to put the innocent party in a better position than if the contract had been fulfilled. 139 Some instructions combine approaches. 140 At base, all Same Position instructions provide the jury with an abstract target and little guidance on how to reach it.
Case law illustrates the operation of Same Position instructions at the trial level. In Tri State Grease & Tallow Co. v. BJB, LLC, 141 the defendant BJB argued that a Same Position instruction was an incomplete measure of damages. 142 The jury awarded Tri-State $478,890 in lost profits for breach of a covenant not to compete. 143 The award was higher than the loss of $469,163.40 estimated by the plaintiff's co-owner. 144 It was also significantly higher than the estimate given by plaintiff's accountant, who testified that the firm's net profit during the relevant time period was merely $37,750. 145 BJB moved for a new trial because the trial court declined to read its proposed jury instructions on lost-profit damages. 146 The trial court denied the motion, stating that its proposed instruction would be duplicative with the instruction given, which "closely tracked" Minnesota's pattern instruction on contract damages. 147 The instruction given read, in pertinent 136. Cf. 1 KEHOE, supra note 73, at 772-73 (noting there is no particular standard for the wording of benefit of the bargain instructions).
137. E.g., SUPERIOR COURT OF DEL., PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR CIVIL PRACTICE IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE § 22.24 (2006) , available at http://courts.delaware.gov/Superior/pattern/pattern.stm ("[T]he other party is entitled to compensation in an amount that will place it in the same position it would have been in if the contract had been properly performed.").
138. E.g., COMM. ON MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, MICHIGAN MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 142.31 (2011) , available at http://www.courts.michigan.gov/courts/ michigansupremecourt/mcji/pages/contracts.aspx ("Contract damages are intended to give the party the benefit of the party's bargain by awarding him a sum of money that will, to the extent possible, put [him/her/it] in as good a position as [he/she/it] would have been in had the contract been fully performed.").
139. E.g., TENNESSEE PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL § 14.70 (2010) ("The plaintiff is not entitled to be put in a better position by a recovery of damages for breach of contract than would have been realized had there been full performance.").
140 The defendant appealed, arguing that this instruction was incomplete because it failed to "provide the jury specific guidance on lost-profits damages." 149 The appeals court, affirming the judgment, noted that lostprofit damages in Minnesota shared the same principles as general damages. 150 Lost profits must be: (1) the "natural and probable consequence" of the breach; (2) reasonably certain; and (3) not be speculative, remote, or conjectural. 151 The court stated that these principles were communicated to the jury by the instruction given, obviating the need for more specific instructions. 152
C. Natural Result
Pattern contract damage instructions in eight states jettison the Same Position destination as well as the Expectation Formula road map. 153 Instead, these jurisdictions use abstract language that grants juries considerable discretion and provides little guidance on how to measure damages. 154 We call these "Natural Result" instructions. (2) Loss may be foreseeable as a probable result of a breach because it follows from the breach (a) in the ordinary course of events . . . ." (emphasis added)); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 330 (1932) ("In awarding damages, compensation is given for only those injuries that the defendant had reason to foresee as a probable result of his breach when the contract was made. If the injury is one that follows the breach in the usual course of events, there is sufficient reason for the defendant to foresee it . . . ." (emphasis added)).
Virginia's instruction is representative: "If you find your verdict for the plaintiff, then he is entitled to recover as damages all of the losses he sustained [,including gains prevented,] that are a natural and ordinary result of the breach and that he has proved by the greater weight of the evidence." 155 Other states use similarly vague language. 156 Juries are instructed to award recovery for damages that "arise naturally," 157 those that occur within the "ordinary" 158 or "usual" 159 course of things, and those that are "likely to result," 160 or are "probable and natural." 161 Juries may also be instructed to award damages "proximately caused" by the breach. 162 C.C. Payne v. Ace House Movers, Inc., 163 demonstrates a defendant's failed attempt to assign error to the broad wording of a Natural Result instruction and to advocate for the use of an Expectation Formula-type alternative. The plaintiff homeowner hired the defendant moving company to relocate his house, 164 and the house and its foundation were damaged during the move. 165 The plaintiff sought $2,544.09 for repairs due to breach of contract. 166 The jury returned a verdict of $4,000. 167 The sole instruction read: "[Should the jury find for the plaintiff,] they should allow him such sum as 156. In addition to providing little guidance as to the proper measure of damages, many Natural Result jurisdictions use morally subjective language, instructing the jury to award damages that "fairly" compensate the plaintiff for the breach. E.g., CIVIL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM., HAWAII STANDARD CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS No. 15.10 (2009) 315, 323, n.8 (Idaho 1990 ) (Natural Result instruction prompting the court to declare that "any award of damages made by the Court would have been far less than the award made, and it would have been sufficiently less to convince me that the award of compensatory damages could only be the result of passion and prejudice." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
164. the evidence shows will fairly compensate him for the loss sustained by him by reason of the damage done him." 168 The defendant objected that the instruction did not reflect "the true rule for ascertainment of damages in an action of assumpsit." 169 Instead, the defendant urged that "the proper measure of damages . . . is the difference between the fair market value of the property immediately before the injury and the fair market value thereof immediately following the injury, plus necessary and reasonable expenses incurred by the owner in connection with the injury." 170 The court rejected the defendant's argument, reasoning that the defendant's suggested instruction was for tort cases, not contract. 171 The court stated that the proper measure of damages was the reasonable cost of repairs necessary due to the damage, and thus the instruction was proper even though it did not "define any specific measure of recovery." 172 Ultimately, the court found the jury's verdict excessive and granted a new trial but stopped short of blaming the instruction. 173 Missouri provides an illuminating study of Natural Result instructions. Its rich case law interprets and ultimately defends its general damage instruction, section 4.01 of the Missouri Approved Jury Instructions (MAI 4.01) . 174 This attention is likely due to MAI 4.01's abstract nature 175 and the fact that use of Missouri pattern instructions is mandatory. 176 MAI 4.01 reads, in pertinent part:
If you find in favor of plaintiff, then you must award plaintiff such sum as you believe will fairly and justly compensate plaintiff for any damages you believe plaintiff sustained [and is reasonably certain to sustain in the future] as a direct result of the occurrence mentioned in the evidence. 177 Soon after its adoption, the Missouri Supreme Court in Boten v. Brecklein 178 gave MAI 4.01 the dubious distinction of being appropriate until a "more detailed" instruction was drafted. 179 The defendants, appealing a jury verdict for breach of contract, claimed that MAI 4.01 was too general for contract claims and only appropriate for tort cases. 180 The court disagreed, characterizing MAI 4.01 as "a short, simple, general instruction which directs an award which will fairly compensate plaintiffs for their damages." 181 Further, because the trial court used MAI 4.01, the court reasoned that it did not need to "precisely delineate the measure of damages." 182 The court ultimately rejected the defendant's argument that the jury award was excessive and evidenced jury bias. 183 Missouri courts strict adherence to pattern instructions appeared to loosen in Crank v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. 184 In Crank, the plaintiff brought his car to the defendant, a mechanic, to have an oil filter installed. 185 Later, the gasket between the oil filter and engine ruptured, ruining the engine and rendering the car worthless. 186 Plaintiff incurred additional damages including missed income, car rental, and interest on money borrowed to pay the repair bill. 187 According to the plaintiff, his entire damages totaled $4,759.45. 188 The jury awarded him $7,000, leading the court to conclude that "prejudice . . . is obvious." 189 The court determined that the pattern instruction did not instruct the jury on damages reasonably contemplated at the time of contracting and remanded for retrial on the damages issue. 190 
IV. AN EXPERIMENT AND DISCUSSION

A. Methodology
To test the influence that differing jury instructions might have on actual verdict awards, we undertook a simple survey experiment, asking subjects to read about a simple breach of contract problem: 179. Id. at 93. Although MAI 4.01 was revised in 2002, the 1970 instruction is nearly identical to the current version. Instruction No. 6 given in Boten reads: "If you find the issues in favor of plaintiffs, then you must award the plaintiffs such sum as you believe will fairly and justly compensate plaintiffs for any damages you believe they sustained as a direct result of the defendants' termination of said contract." Id. at 92.
180. Id. at 93. 181. Id. Despite its conclusion, the court announced more familiar measures of general damages in its analysis: "the amount which will compensate the injured person for the loss which a fulfillment of the contract would have prevented . Please imagine that Sally is a homeowner. She was preparing to put her home on the market. Before she sold her house, Sally wanted to fix the plumbing in two bathrooms.
According to a reliable realtor, having modern plumbing in the bathroom would increase the sale price by $7,000 in total. Sally contacted a local plumber, John, who suggested that he could do the job for $5,000. Sally's house is old and requires certain kinds of pipes, which John agreed to use. John and Sally signed a contract agreeing to the date, price, and nature of the service. Sally's payment was due on installation, and the work was to be done right before the first open house.
When purchasing materials for the job, John decided to save money with cheap silicone piping rather than the costly copper pipe that Sally's house needed.
On the morning before the open house, Sally turned on the sink in one of the bathrooms. Water sputtered wildly, and then leaked out of the vanity. Sally could not reach John so she called a local contractor. That contractor was able to fix the problem, but it cost $8,000 because of the damage and the short notice. Sally had not yet paid John's fee.
Sally sued John for breach of contract. The court found that John breached the contract because he failed to install the appropriate pipes.
The only question left for you-the jury in the case-is what John owes Sally.
We assigned subjects to three conditions, telling them that the relevant law looked like the (1) Expectation Formula, 191 (2) Same Position, 192 or (3) Natural Result. 193 For each condition, we asked subjects to indicate the amount that they would award in damages as a juror, their assignment of the morality of the promisor's conduct, and their prediction of how satisfied the promisee would be with their verdict. 194 191. "The measure of damages for a breach of contract is that amount of money necessary to place Sally in the same economic position she would have been in if the contract had not been breached. To calculate the damages, first determine the amount of money Sally would have received had the contract not been breached. Next, add the amount of incidental and consequential damages, if any. Incidental damages include any costs Sally incurred while making reasonable efforts to avoid losses, whether the efforts were successful or not. Consequential damages include damages resulting from the breach, such as injury to persons or property. Lastly, subtract from that any money Sally saved because John did not have to complete the contract. How much would you award Sally in damages?"
192. "Now that Sally has proved her claim against John for breach of contract, you also must decide how much money will reasonably compensate Sally for the harm caused by the breach. This compensation is called 'damages.' The purpose of such damages is to put Sally in as good a position as she would have been if John had not broken the contract. How much would you award Sally in damages?"
193. "Sally is entitled to recover as damages all of the losses she sustained, including gains prevented that are a natural and ordinary result of the breach. How much would you award Sally in damages?"
194. Subjects had to award damages prior to viewing pages asking them to assign scores for morality or to predict satisfaction. Therefore, their damage awards were not influenced by these subsequent questions.
Next, for each of our three main conditions, we added an alternative scenario, where the subjects were told-in addition to the information conveyed above-that the breach of contract had occasioned a specified emotional harm:
During the trial, Sally testified as follows: *** Q: How did John's breach of contract make you feel? S: I felt betrayed. It's frustrating because you really have to go on someone's word when you hire them. I'm not a plumber-I just have to trust him. And his word was no good. Now it's going to be harder to trust people.
Thus, we assigned subjects to six total conditions: an emotionally inflected and an emotionally neutral version of each of the three damage instructions.
We recruited subjects from Amazon Mechanical Turk, paying them between $0.70 and $0.90 per competed survey. 195 A total of 409 subjects successfully completed a survey 196 : 208 (50.9%) were men. The average age in the pool was thirty-three, and subjects ranged from eighteen to seventy-three. Across all conditions, 332 subjects (81%) self-identified as White/non-Hispanic; 27 (6.6%) self-identified as Asian/Pacific Islander; and 20 (4.8%) self-identified as Black/African American. 197
B. Results
Figure 2 reports summary statistics consisting of the mean damages for each condition. As Figure 2 illustrates, in two of the three conditions, subjects in the "emotional" condition awarded greater damages than in the "standard" condition. Further, Figure 2 demonstrates that subjects in the Natural Result jurisdiction awarded much more in damages than in either of the Expectation Formula or Same Position jurisdictions. 196. We recruited 651 subjects from Amazon Mechanical Turk. We eliminated eightyfour subjects because they had previously been exposed to a similar stimuli in a previous experiment by one of the authors. An additional seventy-eight subjects failed a manipulation check, in which we asked subjects how much Sally had agreed to pay John in the contract; any subject who did not provide the correct answer ($5,000) was dropped. Finally, we eliminated subjects who completed the survey in an excessively short period of time (less than two minutes). These manipulation checks are especially important when dealing, as we are here, with anonymous internet respondents. 197. The remaining twelve subjects were in other ethnic categories.
Figure 2: Mean Damages, Per Condition
One can analyze these data in a variety of ways. Though traditionally social psychologists have used analysis of variance (ANOVA) and related approaches for experimental models, a more comprehensive approach relies on multiple regression. 198 Here, our dependent variable is continuous, making a linear regression both convenient and easy to interpret.
In the linear regression reported in Table 1 below, we regress damages awarded against a variety of control variables, including dummies for the experimental conditions, and control variables including the age, ethnicity, education, 199 and gender. We omit the standard expectation formula condition: thus, all results refer to that baseline. 199. We questioned subjects about their educational attainment. In our pool, 2.5% lacked a high school degree, 12% graduated high school, 30% attended college but do not have a degree, 8.5% have an associate's degree, 31% a bachelor's degree, 12% a master's degree, 2.5% a professional degree, and 2% a doctoral degree. Interpreting this regression is straightforward. Both versions of the Natural Result condition produce damage estimates that are significantly more-both in practical and statistical terms-than either the Same Position or the Expectation Formula instructions. Indeed, the coefficients imply that holding all else equal, Natural Result instructions (in the standard condition) will result in $2,214.50 more in damages than the Expectation Formula-an increase of over 40%. Or to put it differently: the Natural Result instruction motivates subjects to be much more generous to promisees than either of the other two conditions.
A corollary is that the Same Position and the Expectation Formula do not produce statistically distinguishable damage results from one another. Moreover, although the emotional variants produce higher damages than the standard variants in both the Expectation Formula and Natural Result conditions, the differences are not statistically significant. 200 Some of our controls produce marginally significant results, though not in ways that are easy to explain ex ante. There is a modest effect for age (older respondents award fewer dollars in damage) and for gender (male respondents award more in damages than female respondents). We find no significant effects for educational attainment or ethnicity. 201 200. A t-test produces the same result. For the differences between versions of the Expectation Formula, we find t = 0.9340, and p = 0.1760. For the differences between versions of the Same Position instruction, we find t = -0.0896, and p = 0.5356. For the differences between versions of the Natural Result instruction, we find t = 1.1034, and p = 0.1359. However, and crucially, given the large standard deviations, the sample sizes (all < 100) are much too low for us to confidently conclude that we have avoided Type II error. A basic power calculation suggests that with standard deviations of ~500 and means of ~9,000, we would require 500 observations in each condition to confidently test the null hypothesis.
201. In an additional prompt, we asked individuals to report on their perception of the moral wrongfulness of the promisor's conduct. We found, as expected, that individuals
C. Discussion
This very simple survey experiment illustrates the power of pattern jury instructions to shape damage awards. We highlight several results in this subsection.
First, although their wordings differed, the Same Position and Expectation Formula would produce basically equivalent jury outcomes. This suggests that the two kinds of instructions, which together represent the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions with instructions available, should be viewed as interchangeable. To a degree, this finding undermines a justification for the formulaic approach, which sacrifices lay clarity to purportedly achieve greater compliance and predictability.
Second, according to the most parsimonious understanding, the amount of money necessary to put Sally in the position she would have been in had the contract been performed is $3,000: calculated as the difference between $8,000 (her loss in value) and $5,000 (what she saved by not paying John). 202 But mean award in the standard Expectation Formula condition was $7,498: a whopping 150% increase. 203 There are at least two ways to frame such excessive awards. Clearly, in all conditions-even in the Standard Expectation Formula-our subjects were likely to award more in damages than necessary to put the promisee in the position she would have been in had the contract been performed. 204 Reworking Figure 2 to calculate the difference between the observed awards and those that the expectation interest alone would apparently justify, we find a significant premium in every experiment.
reported higher amounts of moral outrage in emotional variants of conditions. However, the differences were not significant. The only significant effect was age; younger subjects were less likely to find the breach morally offensive.
202. Or, the difference between the market value of services at the time of breach ($8,000) and the price of those services at the time of contracting ($5,000).
203. For the purposes of expositional simplicity, we ignored a possible set-off that would reduce the damage award as a consequence of the promisee in effect being insured against her contract becoming a losing one.
204
. In an open-ended essay, subjects offered various explanations for their awards. One pointed out "John could have caused Sally more problems later. This kind of behavior makes me very angry." Another pointed to the "inconvenience factor." [Vol. 81
Figure 3: The Difference Between Observed Damage Awards and Awards Resulting from a Pure Economic Calculus
From one perspective, subjects appeared to use Sally's $8,000 loss as their anchor-especially in the Expectation Formula and Same Position instructions. 205 Rather than incorporating Sally's expected profit, subjects awarded her reliance costs. Only in the Natural Result condition did subjects award an additional amount for lost profits-while failing to subtract what Sally would have paid.
A complementary explanation attributes the observed premiums in part to subjects compensating noneconomic losses. Notably, in two of the conditions Sally's emotional losses produced higher damage awards, though such differences were not statistically significant. In addition, the Natural Result instruction-which provides the most latitude for jurors to express their intuitions by referring to just and fair compensation-had significantly higher awards than the other instructions. The anchoring rationale described above would not explain this difference.
In sum, we have found some evidence that pattern jury instructions used in almost all American states do not constrain juries to the promisee's bargained-for benefit particularly well. Rather, juries may be permitted to express their feeling that damage verdicts alone are unlikely to make promisees whole. 206 
CONCLUSION
The conventional story of noneconomic contract damages is too simple. In that story, almost no contract cases will end with an award of noneconomic damages. Only rare cases-the kind that end up torturing 1Ls in our perverse casebooks-engender righteous recoveries of emotional losses. In this way, we protect the contract law adjudication system from overcompensation and whimsy, while dampening the public emotional stakes of breach. 207 We accept that in most jurisdictions, judges will deny most forms of noneconomic damages, if the right motion is presented at the right moment in the life of the case. But litigations that result in considered appellate opinions are not just rare: they are exceptional. 208 Most cases settle in the shadow of an expected jury verdict. And those expected jury verdicts relate to pattern instructions. As we have demonstrated, contract pattern instructions are significantly less restrictive of noneconomic losses than the treatises would have led us to believe. Controlled testing found that almost no experimental subjects awarded the promisee's bare economic expectation. Rather, they usually awarded more when provided with information about emotional losses, and they were especially likely to do so when instructed with the Natural Result prompt-common in eight States.
We thus provide a more realistic picture of how contract litigation may proceed in actual cases. Because jurists lack a full set of information about contract dispositions, whether in federal or state court, 209 our work, which combines experimental findings and real world jury instructions, sheds important light on an understudied area of law. It could serve as a model for studying jurisdictional variation in other areas of contract doctrine, especially those practically consequential issues of interpretation, material breach, and defenses. Indeed, all of us who would seek to generalize about contract "law" should work to understand how it is translated to lay fact finders. We may find a more complex and interesting world than the treatises have led us to imagine.
